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1 Introduction 
The climax of democratic consolidation on the African Continent has, 
generally speaking, taken place in the de-jure transitions from single party 
rule, where incumbent regimes monopolised nearly every facet of political and 
economic life, to a system of plural politics where alternative parties were 
legally permitted to organise and challenge the existing political order. For 
many of the incumbent parties on the continent as well as international 
donors, multiparty elections were and still are considered to be the clearest 
expression of a ‘new’ liberal political order and the pinnacle of democratic 
decision-making. However, the majority of those that follow and conduct 
research on the African political scene point out that the emergence of 
opposition political parties and multiparty elections is an insufficient measure 
of democracy, whereby most African states appear to be in the midst of a 
stalled transition.  
 
In Kenya for example, Daniel Arap Moi’s approval of the adoption of 
multiparty politics in 1991, and the subsequent elections in 1992 was 
unsuccessful in overturning the incumbent Kenya African National Union 
(KANU). Furthermore, the opposition parties themselves appeared unable to 
maintain any significant degree of internal cohesion, as the main opposition 
organisation, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), split into 
FORD-Kenya led by Oginga Odinga and FORD-Asili led by Kenneth Matiba. 
 
The Multiparty experience in Zambia was considerably different, yet equally 
problematic in several respects. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD), after defeating President Kaunda and the incumbent United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991, experienced massive defections and 
fragmentation. More importantly, in a manner resembling the experiences 
under UNIP, the MMD itself has resorted to repressive measures in 
implementing unpopular World Bank and IMF structural adjustment 
programs (Ihonvbere 1996). 
 
The adoption of plural politics in Tanzania in 1992 and the subsequent 
multiparty elections in 1995 never generated a united opposition front similar 
to the early stages of FORD in Kenya and the MMD in Zambia. Generally 
speaking, aside from a few failed attempts at forming united fronts, opposition 
politics in Tanzania remains relatively fragmented, weak, and seemingly 
disorganised. In short, similar to the experiences in Kenya and Zambia, 
multiparty politics in Tanzania appears to be strikingly absent of strong 
opposition parties capable of driving the consolidation of democracy in a 
forward direction. 
 
This article focuses most of its attention on the five main Tanzanian 
opposition parties that have operated in varying capacities since the early 
1990s. Specifically, this article seeks to describe the institutionalisation of the 
five main Tanzania opposition parties, primarily focusing on trends in 
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institutional building as well as the main factors that appear to limit 
institutional development. 
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2 Defining the Model 
While the roles and importance of political parties in developing democracies 
might be subject to controversial debates in academic circles, this article 
understands that contesting elections and winning political offices are one of 
the most direct and legitimate links between the state and society. On a 
theoretical level, these links serve as one, perhaps the most important method 
that the electorate has in influencing the direction of government policy. 
Political parties themselves can be seen as organisations that rally together to 
contest elections and express common agendas, with the immediate goal of 
winning political positions in the government. In their attempts in effecting 
government policy parties can be seen as channelling the forces of social 
cleavages, whether class, religious, or ethnic based, through mutually accepted 
institutions for cleavage mediation, such as legislative assemblies. The 
capacities in parties serving as links between state and society will largely 
depend on their ability in operating as institutions. 
 
As institutions, parties are generally understood as being stable and durable 
expressions of particular social cleavages, whose existence in the political 
environment is both taken-for-granted and path dependent in the sense that 
past platform and ideological statements constrain future platform 
possibilities. Indeed, such an understanding is unequivocally suggestive of the 
fact that institutionalisation processes are subject to the constraints of time. 
Therefor, an analysis of the institutional developments of the Tanzanian 
opposition parties must be sensitive to their relatively adolescent nature. 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Party Institutionalisation 
 
 Attitudinal Structural 
Internal Order (1) Value Infusion (2) Organisational Strength 
External Order (3) Reification (4) Party Autonomy 
Source: Randall & Svåsand 1999: 9  
 
 
The institutionalisation model used in this article was designed by Lars 
Svåsand and Vicky Randall, and consists of the four institutional dimensions 
depicted in figure 1, capturing most of what has already been stated about 
party institutionalisation. The model includes two dimensions that concern 
issues related to internal party values and structures: value infusion and 
organisational strength, and two dimensions that relate to values and 
structures in external environment: party autonomy and reification. 
Institutional developments within these four dimensions contributes to the 
development of party stability, longevity, and overall party 
institutionalisation. 
 
The first dimension in the Randall-Svåsand model is value infusion, which 
describes the strength of the affiliations that party members and supporters 
have with their respective parties. As the authors of the model point out, value 
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infusion is partially determined by a party’s affiliation with some form of 
social base as well as the strength of the affiliations between party members 
and party leaders. In this article, the analysis of the Tanzanian opposition 
parties therefor, focuses on the relationships between party supporters and 
party platforms, including social, religious, and tribal relationships. In this 
respect, “the more the party members and supporters identify with the party 
as an expressive phenomenon, and the higher the degree of voter loyalty, the 
more institutionalised [the party] is” (Randall & Svåsand 1999: 9). The 
assumption here is that, as expressions of social cleavages, party platforms will 
reflect the interests of particular groups of supporters; party membership is 
based on an identification with party platforms. 
 
Equally important for the forthcoming analysis, in parties where leader loyalty 
is strong, the ultimate weakening of the identity between party members and 
their respective parties may prevail. All other things equal, parties with strong 
links with members and supporters will be institutionally stronger than parties 
where members are more fluid and have weak party loyalties. 
 
The second dimension of party institutionalisation is found in cell 2 in figure 
one, labelled as organisational strength. At the formative stage of party 
construction, certain organisational arrangements are laid out, either formally 
or informally, such as methods of task execution, internal factional mediation, 
and decision-making, as well as the structuring of the internal composition of 
the organisation in the form of committees and administrative agencies. Over 
time, procedural stability will likely set in as parties acquire certain types of 
organisational traditions or routines in how they conduct decision-making and 
task executing procedures; the parties themselves will develop a more 
systematic structure and seemingly automatic methods of making decisions 
and executing tasks. The nature of these routines will likely be shaped by the 
degree to which methods of decision-making, conflict resolution, and task 
execution are defined in party statutes (Randall & Svåsand 1999: 12-17).  
 
The analysis of organisational strength in this article pays particular attention 
to the development and institutionalisation of methods of task execution and 
decision-making. Of special importance for the forthcoming analysis are the 
presence and operations of party decision-making and executing organs from 
the national level all the way down to the grassroots. Aside from the 
functioning of party organisations, the analysis below will also focus on the 
intensity of unmediated party factions as signs of poorly defined methods of 
decision-making and conflict resolution as well as a contribution to further 
organisational decay. Equally important, the forthcoming analysis also focuses 
on the availability o financial resource as a component to organisational 
development. 
 
Political parties do not operate in a vacuum. They effect and are effected by 
the external environment in which they operate. Randall and Svåsand’s model 
captures two external dimensions of party institutionalisation. The first is 
referred to as reification: “the extent to which a political party becomes 
installed in the popular imagery and as a factor shaping the behaviour of 
political actors” (Randall & Svåsand 1999: 21). A party that is reified in the 
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minds of the electorate possesses certain symbolic traits, mostly revolving 
around the policies or ideologies it claims to represent as well as its overall 
behaviour in the party system. As an institution, the names of a party, when 
pronounced, read or heard, signifies or symbolises a certain historical product 
of the party's platform and past performance.  In the minds of the electorate, 
the party is placed on an abstract continuum where the party's platform, 
ideology, and constituencies are compared with those of other parties.  
 
The reification analysis in this article briefly focuses on some of the key factors 
that are understood as effecting the disposition of the electorate’s attitudes 
regarding these five opposition parties. These factors include (1) the general 
perceptions toward multiparty democracy and the incumbent regime, (2) 
opposition participation in parliament, and (3) the performance of the 
opposition parties during election campaigns. The reification assumption is 
that parties with a well-established image in the electorate are more likely to 
operate as institutions than parties with no established image. It is also 
assumed that parties symbolising popular issues, unity, and energy are more 
likely to possess long-run viability than parties symbolising disunity, 
corruption, and stagnation (Randall & Svåsand). 
 
The final dimension depicted in figure 1 is labelled as party autonomy and is 
the least straightforward concept in the Randall & Svåsand model. On one 
level, party autonomy is a condition where the party itself is “not at the 
mercy” of any one particular extra-party organisation (Randall & Svåsand 
1999: 9). Phrased differently, party autonomy seeks to define the degree to 
which a party’s existence depends on the existence of any one particular extra-
party organisation.   
 
Extra-party organisations may consist of NGOs, interest groups, other 
political parties, as well as the state itself. The potential exists for parties to be 
formed by extra-party organisations, or over time, can grow to be dominated 
by an extra-party organisation. Where extra-party organisations are the 
sources for party legitimacy, party autonomy is said to be constrained as the 
party itself is nothing more than an operational appendage of a higher power; 
it is seen as an expendable tool whose potential for stability and adaptability 
are functions of the dictates from the higher organisation.  
 
On another level, the autonomy of a party will be constrained if the chief 
source of party legitimacy rests in the hands of a few party leaders. This aspect 
of party autonomy, while not exclusively in the external environment as 
portrayed in figure 1, is detrimentally important for party autonomy. Without 
accounting for the possibility of party personalisation for example, it might be 
erroneously concluded that a particular party is sufficiently autonomous, 
when in reality, the source of party stability, legitimacy, and the allegiance of 
the party members rests in the hands of one or a few party leaders rather than 
in the hands of a distinct party institution (Randall & Svåsand 1999). The 
party autonomy analysis of the Tanzanian Opposition parties will focus on 
various aspects that potentially limit party autonomy, such as the 
monopolisation of party contributions by extra-party organisations or party 
leaders and trends in power personalisation. 
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3 Background to Multiparty Transition 
For all practical purposes, Tanzania up to 1992, was governed as a one-party 
state for nearly thirty-years. Single party rule in Tanzania, comparatively 
speaking, was more democratic in nature than many other single-party 
regimes in Africa. For the most part, regular elections have been held every 
five years since 1965 and the airing of complaints against the state or 
TANU/CCM was at least tolerated to some degree. However, compared to 
KANU in Kenya or UNIP in Zambia, the single-party regime in Tanzania 
monopolised politics in such a way that left no political space outside the 
TANU/CCM party apparatus. While citizen complaints would be heard, 
alternative views that seemed to counter the justifications and legitimacy of 
single-party rule and socialism were generally not well received with the CCM. 
In this sense, single-party rule promoted a legacy of political apathy and fear 
against expressing opposition (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992). 
 
Even regularised elections were to a large degree meaningless in outcome. 
Although voters had power in changing who held political positions, they had 
no real ability in effecting policy output since all political candidates were 
from TANU/CCM, thus homogeneous in outlook. In effect, politics became a 
contest of personalities rather than policies or platforms, further eroding 
government transparency and accountability and increasing apathy as many 
voters regarded acts of voting as a waste of time (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992). 
 
In relation to personality, struggles for political power did not occur on a 
horizontal level, i.e. between parties and polices. Instead, political struggles 
occurred within TANU/CCM in a vertical fashion where personalities and 
patronage were more important virtues than ideas and merit (Mmuya & 
Chaligha 1992: 6). As this article unfolds, we will see the possible influence 
that these colonial and one-party legacies have on today’s opposition parties in 
the Tanzanian multiparty system. 
 
The push for the adoption of multiparty politics in Tanzania was the result of 
domestic forces as well as forces in the international environment. On the 
international level, the collapse of the one-party states in Eastern Europe 
prompted the questioning of the future of the Tanzanian one-party state on 
the part of several long-time leaders of the incumbent party, the Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM), including Julius Nyerere. At the same time, pressures from 
international financial lenders such as the IMF and World Bank mounted as 
aid conditionalities expanded from the economic structural adjustment sphere 
into the realm of ‘good governance’, including the adoption of plural politics 
and the observance of human rights. 
 
Equally important for the drive toward multiparty politics were the swelling 
pressures from the domestic environment. A particularly crucial group that 
spearheaded the domestic drive towards the adoption of multiparty politics 
were the urban elites who increasingly looked upon the political game as 
better structured under a system whereby competitive politics did not 
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necessarily involve vertical struggles within the CCM itself. Many of these 
elites, after the official adoption of multiparty politics in the summer of 1992, 
were found leading most of the emerging opposition parties. Among the most 
prominent of these leaders were individuals such as Edwin Mtei, formally a 
finance minister, Bank of Tanzania Governor, and a director in the 
International Monetary fund, latter constructed and lead the Party for 
Democracy and Development (CHADEMA); Mabere Marando, formally a 
government security agent and civil rights lawyer who eventually became the 
chief architect of the National Convention for Construction and Reform party 
(NCCR-Mageuzi); Chief Said Fundikira, the first minister of Justice of 
independent Tanzania prior to resigning from his position in 1963 in protest 
to the obvious prospects of one-party rule by TANU. Fundikira would later 
form his own party, the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD). Other 
prominent personalities included James Mapalala, a popular human rights 
advocate that eventually helped create the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW) 
before the party merged with a Zanzibar party called KAMAHURU, lead by 
Khamis Mloo, to form the Civic United Front (CUF).  
 
By the 1995 national elections, other prominent opposition leaders emerged 
by either breaking away from existing opposition parties or defecting from the 
CCM to the opposition ranks. With out a doubt, the most popular opposition 
figure today – Augustine Mrema, former Minister of Labour, grudgingly 
defected from the incumbent regime into the NCCR-Mageuzi’s Chairman 
position, subsequently propelling the party into the most prominent 
opposition status. John Cheyo, a prominent business man from the Bariadi 
district in Shinyanga, emerged out of the UMD to form his own party, the 
United Democratic Party (UDP).  
 
Table 1: Results of the 1994 Local Elections 
 
Party Number of 
Candidate 
Fielded by Each 
Party 
Number of 
Seats 
Percentage of  
Successful 
Candidates 
Percentage 
of Total 
CCM 2409 2327 96,60 % 96,72 % 
CHADEMA 478 22 4,60 % 0,91 % 
CUF 332 21 6,33 % 0,87 % 
UMD 170 3 1,76 % 0,12 % 
UDP 153 16 10,46 % 0,67 % 
TADEA 52 2 3,85 % 0,08 % 
TLP 41 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
PONA 39 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
NCCR-M 32 15 46,88 % 0,62 % 
TPP 27 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
NRA 22 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
NLD 19 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
UPDP 12 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 
 3786 2406 63,55 % 100,00 % 
Source: National Electoral Commission 1994: 1997   
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Indeed, the elite nature of the opposition movement in Tanzania is reflected by 
the social composition of the founders and leaders of these opposition parties. 
As Mmuya and Chaligha conclude, the Tanzanian opposition parties as well 
as the multiparty system are “the product of legislation rather than the spirit 
of a movement” and are “by and large socially engineered from the top” 
(Mmuya & Chaligha 1994: 47). 
 
The lack of popular protests and movements within the apex of the drive for 
multiparty politics was reflected in the almost catastrophic performance of the 
opposition parties in the 1994 local elections, where the 12 opposition parties 
secured a paltry 3,3 percent of the district council seats, as evident in table 1. 
Tables 2 and 3 reveal that by the 1995 general elections, opposition support 
appeared to pick up pace as five of the opposition parties secured 20,1 percent 
of the parliamentary seats with an impressive 40,8 percent of the votes cast. 
Table 3 shows the impressive performance of Mrema in the 1995 presidential 
race, himself a large factor contributing to the gains in opposition support 
since 1994, particularly evident in the large number of votes cast for the 
NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995. 
 
Table 2: Results of the 1995 Parliamentary Elections 
 
Party Percentage of 
Votes 
Total Seats 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi 59,22 219 
NCCR-Mageuzi 21,83 19 
CHADEMA 6,16 28 
Civic United Front 5,02 4 
United Democratic Party 3,32 4 
Others 4,5 0 
Total 100 274 
Source: National Electoral Commission 1997: 45-46 
 
Table 3: Results of the 1995 Presidential Elections 
 
Candidate Number of 
Votes 
Percentage 
of Votes 
Benjamin Mkapa (CCM) 4 026 422 61,8 
Augustine Mrema (NCCR-M) 1 808 616 27,8 
Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF) 418 973 6,4 
John Cheyo (UDP) 258 734 4,0 
Source: National Electoral Commission 1997: 45 
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4 Party Institutionalisation in Tanzania 
4.1 Value Infusion 
Five of the main opposition parties are examined in this article: the NCCR-
Mageuzi, United Democratic Party (UDP), CHADEMA, Civic United Front 
(CUF), and the Tanzanian Labour Party (TLP). All of the parties, except the 
TLP, are parliamentary parties, as indicated in table 2. Thanks to the 
overwhelmingly popular Augustine Mrema leading the party since his 
defection from the NCCR-Mageuzi in early 1999, the TLP can rightfully 
expect to gain parliamentary seats in the upcoming national elections. 
 
The bulk of this value infusion section consists of two specific tasks: (1) 
identifying particular cleavages that potentially identify with each party, (2) 
defining the affiliations between party leaders and party members that 
potentially contribute to the weakening of member-party affiliations. The 
achievement of the first task is complicated by the fact that none of the 
opposition parties appear to espouse any clear party ideology, a trend 
acknowledged by numerous authors. Rwekaza S. Mukandala sites that the 
“current [Tanzanian] movements consciously eschew formal ideologies”…and 
have failed to articulate “a world view” (1995: 31-33). All of the parties claim 
to espouse narrowly different interpretations of social democracy and 
capitalism. All five parties recognise the importance of indigenisation or, as 
backed by the UDP, preferential treatment for Tanzanian businesses, and the 
eradication of government corruption. In short, based on the level of platform 
articulation and variation, if the leaders from all five of these parties convened 
to discuss appropriate government policy, the dialogue would likely be 
overwhelmingly free from divergent opinions. Perhaps the best expression of 
the seemingly homogeneous nature of the opposition ideologies was best 
exemplified by Augustine Mrema during his defection from the CCM to the 
NCCR-Mageuzi about six months prior to the general elections, when 
publicly stating that the he believed the policies of the CCM to be superb, he 
simply had differences with some of the party leaders (Sundet 1996: 29). 
 
While lacking well-defined ideologies and platforms, at the same time, the 
parties have articulated a certain degree of policy priority within their 
platforms, where all five examined in this article appear to differ on a nominal 
level. For example, CHADEMA and the UDP emphasise economic reforms 
over all other issues and have the most conservative welfare state outlook. For 
CHADEMA, the focus is on financial reforms and for the UDP it is the 
redefinition of property rights. The NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP on the other 
hand both place heavy emphasis on agriculture development and the 
development of a capitalist welfare state. It is also the heavier responsibilities 
of the welfare state within their platforms that makes the NCCR-Mageuzi and 
the TLP fall to the left of centre on the political spectrum. The Civic United 
Front naturally focuses much of its attention on the Union question and the 
Human Rights abuses by the Zanzibar CCM and appears to occupy a position 
in the centre of the political spectrum. 
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Table 4: Occupation of Founding Members 
 
Occupation NCCR-M CHADEMA CUF UMD 
Peasant/Farmer 58,7 % 35,0 % 45,0 % 47,5 % 
Public Servant x x x x 
Private Business 29,5 % 50,1 % 26,1 % 52,2 % 
Politician/Other 11,7 % 15,0 % 28,9 % 0,4 % 
n = 1703 2000 3000 2000 
 Mean Median   
Peasant/Farmer 46,6 % 46,3 %   
Public Servant x    
Private Business 39,5 % 39,8 %   
Politician/Other 14,0 % 13,3 %   
     
Source: Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 49    
 
In this article, it is understood that the potential for value infusion between the 
party and its members and supporters is highest when there is some 
congruence between party platform and the social composition of the party 
members. In relation to their platform emphasis, there does appear to be some 
differences between each party in the social composition of their respective 
supporters. Table 4 lists the occupation of founding members of some of the 
more prominent opposition parties in 1994. Evidence suggests that for 
CHADEMA, it is businessmen and women that predominately contribute to 
the party rank and file. For the UDP, although not listed in table 4, other 
evidence indicates that the major party supporters are middle class 
professionals and businesspersons (Maliyamkono 1995). The NCCR-Mageuzi 
at one time appeared to have the broadest membership base, including the 
underprivileged in both the rural and urban areas, lawyers, university 
students, lecturers, professors, and urban professionals. By far, the largest 
supporters for the NCCR-Mageuzi, when compared to the other parties, are 
rural farmers, peasants and the youths, strongly coinciding with the platform 
emphasis of the party (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994). Due to the large number of 
members that crossed over with Mrema in 1999, it is likely that the social 
composition of the NCCR-Mageuzi support is reflected in the social 
composition of the TLP supporter today. One might also speculate that many 
of those that have traditionally supported Mrema during his presidential bid, 
support the TLP today, including a mix of urban professionals, youths, and 
rural and urban poor (Maliyamkono 1995). 
 
Issues revolving around religion play an important factor in Tanzanian 
politics, although parties are prohibited from advancing the causes of one 
religion over another, as dictated under section 9.2(a) of the 1992 Political 
Parties Act. Nevertheless, religion has been evoked in varying level, 
particularly evident during political campaigns. For example, in the Iringa 
Urban constituency, voters were encouraged to vote for the NCCR-Mageuzi 
candidate rather than the CCM Muslim parliamentary candidate (Omari (A) 
1997: 59). In the Temeke by-election, Mrema kept close company with a 
Sheikh in order to appeal to the large Muslim population in the Temeke 
C M I  
 11 
constituency, even though Mrema himself is a Roman Catholic (Maliyamkono 
1997: 12-15). CUF mobilised support by appealing to Muslims on both 
Zanzibar and the Mainland (Omari (A) 1997: 62), by far the most dominant 
religion on the Isles. All-in-all, aside from the overwhelmingly large number of 
Muslims within the CUF rank and file, it is unclear the extent to which 
religion serves as a solid basis for opposition support. 
 
Although strictly prohibited by the Political Parties Act, evidence suggests that 
each of these five parties aggregates support based on ethnic considerations, 
and may provide additional strengths for value infusion. Figure 2 graphically 
depicts the support that each region contributed to the CCM, CHADEMA, 
CUF, UDP and the NCCR-Mageuzi. The Kilimanjaro and Mara regions are 
heavily dominated by the NCCR-Mageuzi and coincides with the ethnic and 
regional origins of the top party leaders in 1995. The Kilimanjaro region is 
also highly supportive of CHADEMA, a party said to be dominated by the 
ethnic Chagga, predominately found in Kilimanjaro and Arusha (Moore 1996: 
589). The UDP is perhaps the clearest case of a party where support is almost 
totally dominated by two regions, both of which are mostly composed of 
ethnic Sukuma, coinciding with the ethnic background of the party leader 
John Cheyo. Indeed, as indicated in figure 2, over 65 percent of the UDP’s 
support in the 1995 parliamentary elections originated in Shinyanga and 
Mwanza. Finally, the regional concentration of CUF’s support is 
predominately restricted to the Pemba portion of Zanzibar, an area which 
contributed to nearly 30 percent of CUF’s support while consisting of less than 
two percent of the voting population in the 1995 parliamentary elections. 
Although CUF’s support on Pemba is tied to considerations of ethnicity, 
support for the party is also tied to the particular historical experiences of 
Zanzibar politics, too lengthy for discussion in this article. 
 
Figure 2: Regional Distribution of Party Support in the 1995 Parliamentary Elections 
Source: Mmuya 1997
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A closer look at the election data reveals that regionally concentrated support 
is also suggestive of the fact that affiliations may have as much to do with the 
relationships between party leaders and party members as they do with parties 
and party members. Indeed, each regional stronghold for each party coincides 
with the home regions of the top party brass. Comparing the support for the 
NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1994 local elections to that in the 1995 national 
elections for example, indicates that the party’s sheer vote volume in 
Kilimanjaro was largely the result of Mrema’s popularity. Being a native of the 
Kilimanjaro Region as well as an ethnic Chagga, all of the constituencies 
within the region that heavily contributed to his presidential votes as well as 
the votes for the party in the parliamentary race, were weak supporters for the 
NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1994 local elections. In fact, the only party to win 
district council seats in the 1994 local elections was CHADEMA. Instead, 
nearly 75 percent of the seats won by the NCCR-Mageuzi in 1994 were in 
Kagera and Mara, coinciding with the home regions of Prince Bagenda and 
Marando, the two top party leaders prior to Mrema’s defection from the 
CCM. 
 
Similar trends are noticeable in the loyalty that Bariadi contributed to the UDP 
in 1994 and 1995.  Of the UDP’s 16 victories in the 1994 local elections, 12 
occurred in the Bariadi  District. Figure 3 indicates that this trend was 
duplicated in the 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
 
Leader loyalty is even more obvious where key party leaders defect from one 
party to another, taking the bulk of the party members with them. Mass 
defections are most clear in Mrema's defection from the NCCR-Mageuzi to 
the TLP and Cheyo's earlier defection from the UMD that spawned the 
foundation of the UDP. 
 
Therefore, while evidence suggests that party affiliations appear to loosely 
coincide with particular social status or ethnic interests, a large portion of 
these affiliations are likely defined by the relationships between party leaders 
and party members, having at least two broad implications for value infusion. 
First, strong links between party leaders and members weakens the ties that 
members have with their respective parties. Thus, when leaders shift from one 
party to the next, most members follow the leader not the party, reducing the 
stability of the party and its prospects for institutional development. Secondly, 
where clientele networks prevail and are structured on charisma or quid pro 
quo transactions, the party leaders themselves have few incentives in 
articulating coherent platforms or ideologies since such formulations do not 
serve as the basis for affiliation or loyalty. In this respect these networks are 
not about promoting groups interests per se. They are more about promoting 
the particularised interests of key patrons and their particular clients. 
Professor Samuel Mushi from the University of Dar es Salaam best qualifies 
these two shortcomings by pointing out that “The imbalance between 
personalities and party programmes in opposition parties, whose leaders are 
said to be larger than the parties is a major stumbling block for the maturity 
and institutionalisation of the parties” (Guardian 08.08.98). 
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Figure 3. 1995 Parliamentary and Presidential Results in Shinyanga 
 
 
 
4.2 Organisational Strength 
The effects that organisational strength has on party institutionalisation seems 
straight forward: How can these five opposition parties develop into viable 
parties without some form of organisational capacity by which to conduct 
party operations.    
 
The analysis of the organisational strength of these five parties occurs on two 
distinct levels. On one level, the organisational strength of a party is dictated 
by a party’s degree of penetration into the local level, allowing a greater and 
more targeted capacity for mobilisation, recruitment, campaigning, and voter 
education. On this level and in comparison to the CCM, none of these parties 
appear to have an adequate level of penetration except in a few select regions 
considered to be their respective strongholds. Perhaps only the NCCR-
Mageuzi, in the past, began to intensively develop their organisational 
presence at the grassroots levels. As for party institutionalisation, the lack of a 
grassroots penetration detrimentally effects the ability for these parties in 
strengthening its relations to local level party supporters and reduces their 
ability in communicating to the electorate, thus weakening their value infusion 
and reification potential. 
 
A second level of analysis for organisational strength concerns the structuring 
and functioning of party decision-making and executing organs. According to 
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the Randall-Svåsand model of party institutionalisation, parties having 
adequately defined and adhered to methods of decision-making and task 
executing are more likely to develop organisational stability than parties 
where methods of decision-making are constantly up for grabs, thus being 
vulnerable to personal power ambitions and factionalism. 
 
Figure 4. Party Organisational Structure 
 
Decision Organ       Executing 
Organ 
 
National Level 
 
Layout duplicated at the  
Regional Level 
District Level              
Ward Level              
Branch Level                
Cell 
 
Source: Mmuya 1998 
 
 
The formal organisational arrangements of each of the five parties resembles 
the organisational layout in figure 4. In reality, the lack of adequate finances 
paired with weakly defined procedural arrangements contributes to significant 
redefinitions of who and which organs conduct party decision-making. In all 
five parties, important policies are oftentimes conceived, drafted, and adopted 
within the executing organs, involving little or no inputs from the decision-
making organs. In addition, these weakly defined organisational arrange-
ments, in some cases, have proven ineffective in mediating the highly 
personalised nature of party faction, resulting in further organisational 
deterioration. The conflicts within the NCCR-Mageuzi, between former 
Chairman Mrema and former Secretary General Mabere Marando that ended 
in Mrema’s defection to the TLP, serve as a good example of the destruction 
caused by unmediated cleavages (Mmuya 1998). Ultimately, due to these 
personalised and unmediated cleavages, the party was reduced from a status as 
one of the most promising opposition organisations to a party with a highly 
questionable future. The parties that have exhibited organisational unity tend 
to be small in size where challenges over leadership power remains minimal. 
Perhaps the only two parties that have exhibited some degree of procedural 
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stability paired with larger amounts of power sharing among party leaders are 
CHADEMA and CUF. 
 
In sum, without sufficient organisational strength and coherence, it will be 
difficult for these parties to recruit and mobilise local level support. In 
addition, the lack of adequately defined and adhered to decision-making 
procedure renders these five parties more vulnerable to personal power 
struggles, consequences of which were evident in the destruction of the 
NCCR-Mageuzi. 
4.3 Reification 
On par with what was discussed earlier, reification is the degree to which a 
political party becomes taken for granted as an integral component of the 
party system. The party name and symbols become commonly associated with 
certain values, ideologies, and practices, whether good or bad in nature. The 
focus of this section therefor, is on the values, ideologies, and practices that 
Tanzanians associate with the major opposition parties and the efforts that 
these parties have made in bolstering their image in the electorate. 
 
A survey conducted in 1994 revealed that around 50 percent of the population 
in Tanzania did not have any knowledge of the new political parties. In 
addition, the survey itself consisted of a sample of 46 percent urban, 
supposedly the most informed citizens. While there is little doubt that 
opposition party awareness has increased since 1994, there are other findings 
from this survey that appear more threatening to the ability of these 
opposition parties in establishing a positive popular image. A wide number of 
those interviewed in the survey indicated that they were unable to differentiate 
between the arguments proposed by the opposition parties with those 
proposed by the ruling party. Whatever the cause of this perceived lack of 
policy differentiation, the important fact is that these parties are unable to 
present themselves to the electorate as clear alternatives to the CCM (Ngware 
1996). 
 
Equally troublesome for party reification are the large number of opinions 
that thought the opposition parties were “fragile, disorganised, [lacking] 
leadership, resources and policies” and were unable in effectively challenging 
the CCM (Ngware 1996: 21).  
 
These opinions may have been partially overturned by the relatively high level 
of parliamentary participation on the part of some of the opposition parties 
since the 1995 elections. While remaining outside the shadow cabinet (filled 
by the UDP and CUF), the NCCR-Mageuzi remained the de-facto opposition 
leader in Parliament up until early 1997, when the Marando-Mrema conflict 
rendered the party to a state of paralysis (Mmuya 1998). Afterwards, the UDP 
essentially took over as the de-facto opposition leader for Mainland issues, 
while CUF continued to express its interests over the Isles. Today, 
parliamentary activity is widely reported in the print media, where at least 
every few days articles are seen describing opposition parliamentary debate. 
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Elections and campaigns serve as an opportunity for parties to market their 
policies and gauge the electorate’s attitude regarding these policies. In nearly 
every respect, none of these opposition parties have managed to fully capitalise 
on the use of election campaigns as vehicles for marketing party platforms. 
Instead, campaign tactics in by-elections and during the 1995 national 
elections emphasised personalities over parties and the CCM’s track record 
over alternative policies (Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 1997). In 
some cases, parties were represented by two different candidates each carrying 
different party flags and symbols within the same constituency, an act that 
probably portrayed disunity and promoted confusion among the electorate 
(Limbu 1997). Perhaps the largest series of by-election blunders took place in 
1997 in the Maketa, Muleba, and Arusha constituencies. In the Maketa and 
Muleba by-elections, the NCCR-Mageuzi was unable to field candidates 
simply because the two party factions were unable to agree on a common 
candidate. The Arusha by-election would have been a certain victory for the 
NCCR-Mageuzi had the two factions agreed to field Nyerere’s son, 
Makongoro Nyerere, instead compromising on a weaker candidate. (National 
Electoral Commission 1997). All-in-all, due to these internal squabbles over 
by-election candidates, the NCCR-Mageuzi was seriously discredited. 
 
Party practices and efforts aside, reification is also influenced by the general 
attitudes that the electorate has regarding multiparty politics. Affirmative 
attitudes toward multiparty politics are more likely to generate acceptance of 
the new opposition parties than attitudes of pessimism. Yet, as indicated in 
table 5, the 1991 Presidential Commission on multiparty change revealed that 
over 77 percent of the Tanzanians wanted to continue with the single party 
system (Presidential Commission Vol. 1). Gero Erdmann’s 1994 survey data is 
relatively consistent with the findings of the Presidential Commission. While 
55 percent of the urban sample supported multiparty change, the rural sample, 
representing the largest population segment, gave the same support at only 43 
percent. In the same survey, only 35 percent believed that multiparty politics 
would strengthen democracy. Instead, the majority believed that multiparty 
politics would strengthen tribalism, weaken national unity, and will contribute 
nothing to the development of the country (Erdmann 1995: 9 -10). 
 
Table 5: Continuation of the Single Party System 
 
 Yes No 
Tanzania Mainland 79,7 % 19,0 % 
Tanzania Zanzibar 56,4 % 43,0 % 
Tanzania Total 77,2 % 21,5 % 
 
Source: Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty Systems Vol. 1 199: 69 
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Table 6: Possible effects of the Multiparty System 
 
The multiparty system Rural Urban Total 
Is a threat to national unity 68,4 % 54,1 % 61,8 % 
Will strengthen tribalism & factionalism 67,1 % 51,9 % 60,1 % 
Is hopeless 62,5 % 45,5 % 54,7 % 
Will strengthen democracy 29,1 % 42,0 % 35,0 % 
 
Source: Erdmann 1994: 10    
 
In the final analysis, there is a strong likelihood that the attitudes regarding 
these five parties remains largely pessimistic today. While parliamentary 
participation is strong, particularly on the part of the UDP, it is unlikely that 
such participation is well followed outside the urban areas. By far, the state 
owned Radio Tanzania, often accused of CCM favouritism, is the most widely 
used media source in the country (Ngware 1996), and may be unlikely to 
grant credit to the opposition performance in parliament. Furthermore, the 
inadequacies of election campaigns have failed in articulating party platforms 
and policies that could enable a stronger basis for party reification. Finally, 
positive party reification is significantly challenged by the persistence of high 
levels of pessimism toward the effects of multiparty politics altogether, 
pessimism continually exploited by CCM propaganda. 
4.4 Party Autonomy 
Based on the discussion in the reification section above, since the adoption of 
multiparty politics in Tanzania was met with considerable scepticism, one 
might suspect that the domestic drive for multiparty change originated from 
political elites rather than grassroots mass movements. While some of the 
founding members of these parties may have had common origins, the 
founding leaders of these parties were almost unanimously urban elites 
possessing a substantial access to financial resources. The elite nature of the 
construction of these five parties, coupled with the organisational legacies of 
the CCM and the one-party state, has powerful impacts on the functioning of 
these parties today. Specifically, all of the parties discussed in this thesis, to a 
varying degree resemble what one might call elite parties, where a handful of 
political elites construct, finance, and manage their own political organisations 
for the purposes of acquiring political power. On an even more narrow level, 
one might attribute some of these parties as entrepreneur parties, where 
foundation and construction processes are carried out by one elite. 
 
The subject of this final empirical section concerns the degree to which that 
these five parties, as political organisations, are distinctly autonomous entities 
from extra-party organisations or a handful of party elites or party 
entrepreneurs. In short, parties that rely on one extra-party organisation or a 
few party leaders will “be less institutionalised than [parties] in which the 
preservation of the organisation is not at the mercy of such factors” (Randall 
& Svåsand 1999: 9).  
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There are several specific issues that concern the party autonomy of these five 
opposition parties. The first issue concerns the fact that all of the parties were 
funded and founded by either one individual party entrepreneur or a handful 
of party elites. In the UDP, party formation took place under the sole initiative 
of the current party leader, in what appears to be a private business venture 
under the authority of one party entrepreneur. In other cases, such as the 
NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP, parties were originally formed by a group of 
elites, and over time became plagued by personal rivalries and claim staking, 
ultimately becoming “susceptible to attempts at building cults of personality” 
based on charisma and/or patronage (Olukoshi 1998: 30). Still, other cases, 
such as CHADEMA and to a lesser extent CUF reflect situations where parties 
were formed by groups of political and/or business elites and have managed to 
thwart attempts at party personalisation, but nonetheless remain heavily 
dependent on a small group of elite party leaders. 
 
A second issue related to party autonomy strictly concerns the primary 
revenue sources that each party depends on. In some respects, financial 
dependence appears to rely on monopolised sources rather than a broad array 
of contributors. Of course, some of the ‘narrowness’ in party contributions 
relates to the narrow cleavages that some of these parties represent. Yet, 
representing narrowly defined cleavages does not totally explain the apparent 
dependence that each of these parties have on private business donations. 
While CHADEMA and to a lesser extent the UDP were founded largely by 
and financed from the business sector, all of the parties have come to be 
heavily dependent on private business donations of some form. This same 
trend is reflected in the CCM itself as it is forced to make ‘behind the scenes’ 
concessions to businesses in exchange for financial and electoral support. The 
opposition’s reliance on the business sector is perplexed by the fact that the 
CCM is able to monopolise these concessions through exclusive access to the 
state, thus placing the incumbent regime at a strategically superior position for 
attracting business affiliates. In short, over reliance on financial support from 
the business sector has the potential of contributing to party instability should 
these sponsors shift their loyalties elsewhere, such as to the CCM. 
 
Another detrimental issue for party autonomy is the cases indicating that party 
contributions are not channelled to the parties for organisational or 
membership development in general. Instead, as evidenced by the personal 
financial support lured by Mrema, a number of the private donations are 
allocated directly to specific party leaders in hopes of enhancing their position 
in the party and the electorate (Mmuya 1998). There is the likelihood that 
these trends at some level are expressed in all of the opposition parties in the 
form of personal alliance relationships. For party autonomy, personal alliances 
are relationships that take place outside the party itself (Randall & Svåsand 
1999: 17), elevating the role of the party leaders, possibly to the point that 
party survival is dependent upon the party leader and his personal alliances. 
 
The monopolisation and/or personalisation of party contributions are 
compounded by the inability of these parties in deriving substantial portions 
of their party finances from party membership fees due to the sheer level of 
poverty found in Tanzania. In addition, the parties are unable to offset the 
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reliance on business finances by linking up with the relatively vibrant forces in 
civil society due to the Societies Ordinance Act that essentially prevents the 
existence of such co-operation. All in all, this situation contributes to the 
weakening of party autonomy by pushing party dependence into the hands of 
the most financially endowed organisations and individuals, most of which are 
found in the business sector. 
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5 Conclusions 
Judging from the discussion thus far, one might conclude that each of these 
five parties are significantly unstable or exhibit vast vulnerability to de-
stabilising effects and are thus institutionally weak. Such a statement is 
supported by at least three pieces of evidence. First, all of these parties, to a 
varying degree, appear to be synonymous with their respective party leaders, 
most evident in the TLP, with the charismatic populist Augustine Mrema, and 
the UDP, with the well financed John Cheyo. With the seemingly strong 
affiliations between the party leaders and their respective supporters, as 
discussed under value infusion, coupled with the over-dependence on the 
personal finances of the party leaders, as discussed under party autonomy, 
party stability is simply a function of the stability of their party leaders. 
 
The blurring of the distinction between party leaders and the parties 
themselves is compounded by the second factor limiting party stability. 
Specifically, each party, to a varying degree, appears lacking in adequately 
defined or adhered to methods of decision-making or conflict resolution, a fact 
pointed out by some of the party leaders themselves. All of these parties were 
essentially formed and organised based on informal methods of decision-
making, yet rendered almost useless as party membership grew and more 
complex issues found their way into leadership circles (Mmuya 1998: 98). In 
the final analysis, weakly defined organisational procedures offers almost no 
ability in constraining personal power ambitions and party factionalism, 
further eroding party stability, as evident in the NCCR-Mageuzi. 
A third key factor that limits the stability of these five parties is the fact that 
all of them have yet to become institutions symbolising specific ideologies or 
platforms outside their ability in criticising the incumbent regime, as identified 
under reification and value infusion. As C. K. Omari points out: 
 
“The major problem for many opposition parties in Tanzania is 
that the candidates specialise in criticisms but fail to move to the 
next stage, i.e. the campaign and policy formation phase” ((B) 
1997: 83). 
 
The values, symbols, and images that have been associated with these five 
opposition parties thus far appears to partially reflect the underlying symbols 
and values that have been associated with the Tanzanian multiparty system in 
general, as evident by the Nyalali Commission, Erdmann, and Ngware studies. 
In sum, parties that have not come to symbols positive and stable values have 
a questionable long-term viability, particularly when faced by a thoroughly 
entrenched incumbent regime such as the CCM. 
 
Yet, it would be a vicious mistake to conclude that all five of these parties 
offer no hope in developing institutional stability in the future. Such a 
statement is clearly supported by four trends that have developed over the past 
several years. The first aspect concerns the strength in value infusion between 
parties and their supporters. While the empirical analysis suggests that party 
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platforms and ideologies are weak and that the strength of the links between 
party members and parties are weakened by the strength of the affiliations 
between party members and party leaders, evidence also indicates that there 
were obvious trends in the social background of some of the party supporters, 
particularly obvious in CHADEMA, CUF, and at least at one time in the 
NCCR-Mageuzi. In the NCCR-Mageuzi and CHADEMA in particular, the 
dominant social sector within each party appears to reflect the primary 
emphasis within each party platform (agricultural emphasis for the NCCR-
Mageuzi and business for CHADEMA). In CHADEMA the current party rank 
and file are overwhelmingly drawn from the small business and cash crop 
sectors and, over time, may develop into a traditional affiliation base within 
the party, even if the basis for these affiliations today are between leaders and 
members. Even in the UDP, evidence suggests that party membership is largely 
drawn on ethnic lines and may offer a strong basis for party support in the 
future, eventually forming a core support group for the party itself. In this 
particular case however, this eventuality will depend on the party leader’s 
willingness to remain in politics; without John Cheyo the UDP would likely 
cease to exist. 
 
A second positive trend observed in Tanzanian opposition politics is that the 
opposition parties, despite their unwillingness in focusing on platforms, has 
largely succeeded in helping to politicise issues related to corruption and 
transparency. John Cheyo and Augustine Mrema have been the two most 
audible voices in attacking the CCM over the loss of revenues and 
transparency due to the corruption disease. On a theoretical level, by 
politicising corruption, a probable product of patron-client relations within 
the neopatrimonial state itself, erodes the basis by which the CCM maintains 
support and legitimacy with their respective clients, potentially pushing their 
support into the opposition camp. During the 1995 presidential campaigns, 
Mrema made painstaking efforts in politicising the unethical practices in the 
government and the CCM. Naturally, the current President, Benjamin Mkapa, 
afraid of defeat in the 1995 presidential race, began to focus much of his 
campaign attention on corruption as well. In fact, his seemingly clean political 
record was one of the reasons why he was chosen as a CCM presidential 
candidate in the first place. Therefor, while the opposition parties may be 
electorally and institutionally weak, they have managed to force the CCM and 
the government to address issues of corruption and transparency and may 
bolster their image as an effective challenge to the incumbent regime. 
 
Efforts in politicising issues and events have also been carried out by some of 
the parliamentary opposition parties. As alluded to in the reification section 
evidence suggests that these parties are beginning to play a type of watchdog 
in the Parliament and have successfully politicised opposition objections to 
CCM legislation, particularly in relation to the recent legislation that allows 
the presidential candidates to win elections with simple majority. Today, 
rarely does a week go by without seeing a newspaper article discussing 
Cheyo’s objections and alternatives to CCM legislation in parliament. As was 
indicated under reification, parliamentary participation is a clear method for 
establishing a party track record as well as assisting in platform articulation. 
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Another positive sign that may assist in the institutionalisation of these parties 
and the consolidation of multiparty democracy in general is the active role 
that some parties are beginning to play in grassroots education in participation 
and democracy. Electoral participation is particularly important in periods of 
transition because it allows individuals at the grassroots level the chance in 
helping shape new political institutions and government policy rather than 
leaving the task to political elites. In particular, CHADEMA’s women’s wing 
is heavily active in organising neighbourhood meetings for educating people 
on their rights and duties within the new multiparty system. Attendees are 
encouraged to participate in elections, civic organisations, and party activities 
(Interview 28.10.99). Similar activities were observed in the youth wing of the 
NCCR-Mageuzi (Interview 22.10.99). These types of activities help strengthen 
the local level presence of the parties while, at the same time, promoting a 
participatory atmosphere at the grassroots level. 
 
At this point in time it is safe to suggest that all five of these parties are, to a 
varying degree, institutionally weak. Perhaps CHADEMA and CUF, do to the 
relatively stable nature of these parties, paired with a less personalised power 
arrangement offer a clearer prospect for further institutionalisation and 
stability. The current arrangement with respect the UDP and the TLP on the 
other hand, greatly depends on the desires of their respective party leaders, 
rendering these two parties as highly susceptible to de-stabilising effects. Due 
to the party’s questionable future the NCCR-Mageuzi today should be seen as 
an example of the effects of the destruction and instability that can result from 
factional fighting and power personalisation. 
 
However, compared with the TLP, CHADEMA’s support is relatively limited 
and small in number. In this respect, if Mrema is willing to ride his political 
career out in the TLP, over time, the party may develop into a stable and 
durable political party, potentially eclipsing its smaller rivals. An equally 
important aspect for party institutionalisation concerns the future of CUF, a 
party not only divided between a Mainland faction and a faction representing 
the Isles, but also between those CUF members on Zanzibar who support the 
Union between the Island and the Mainland and those that want to see the 
formation of an independent Zanzibar. If given the power to govern, this 
division has a tremendous potential for tearing CUF into two, apparently 
incompatible camps. All-in-all, while Tanzania may formally exist as a 
multiparty system, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the future existence 
of these new parties that have emerged to challenge the legitimacy of the 
CCM’s single-party rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C M I  
 23 
6 Literature List 
Erdmann, Gero. Guided Democratisation: Political Perceptions and Attitudes in 
Tanzania. Africa discussion Papers No.11, Breman. 1995. 
Guardian, the. 8 August 1998, “Personalities Larger than Parties Says Varsity 
Academic”. Ng’wanakilala, Fumbuka. 
Ihonvbere, Julius O. economic crisis, Civil Society and Democratisation: The Case 
of Zambia. African World Press, Inc., United States. 1996. 
Interview. 22.10.99, NCCR-Mageuzi National Headquarters, Dar es Salaam. 
Interview. 28.10.99, CHADEMA National Headquarters, Dar es Salaam. 
Limbu, Festus. Experiences of Campaigning for a Parliamentary Seat. In Omari, 
C.K. The Right to Choose a Leader: Reflection on the 1995 Tanzanian 
General Elections. Dar es Salaam University Press, Tanzania. 1997: Chapter 5. 
Maliyamkono, T. L. The Race for the Presidency: The first Multiparty Democracy 
in Tanzania. Tema Publishers Company LTD., Dar es Salaam. 1995. 
--- Tanzania on the Move. Tema Publishers Company, Ltd., Dar es Salaam. 1997. 
Mmuya, Max and Chaligha, Amon. Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania. Dar es 
Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1992. 
 --- Political Parties and Democracy in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam University Press, 
Tanzania. 1994. 
Mmuya, Max. Government and Political Parties in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam 
University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1997. 
--- Political Parties in Eclipse: Crises and Cleavages in Political Parties. Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Dar es Salaam. 1998. 
Moore, Sally Falk. Post-Socialist Micro-Politics: Kilimanjaro, 1993. In “Africa: 
Journal of the International African Institute”. Vol. 66 No. 4. 1996: 587-605. 
Mukandala, Rwekaza S. Ideological Challenges of the Transition to Pluralism. In 
Reflections on the Transition to Democracy in Tanzania. REDET, Dar es 
Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1995: Chapter 4. 
National Electoral Commission. Local Government Election Results. Unpublished 
Document. 1994. 
--- The Report of the National Electoral Commission for the Period From 14th 
January, 1993 to 13th January, 1998. NEC. 1997. 
Ngware, Suleiman. Local Government and Multipartism in Tanzania: Empirical 
Findings. Unpublished Work. 1996. 
Olukoshi, Adebayo O. Economic Crisis, Multipartyism, and Opposition Politics in 
Contemporary Africa. In Olukoshi, Adebayo (Ed). The Politics of Opposition 
in Contemporary Africa. Nordiska Afrikainsititutet, Stockholm. 1998: Chapter 
1. 
Omari, C. K. (A) Factors Which Influence Voters. In Omari, C. K. (Ed.). The Right 
to Choose a Leader: Reflections on the 1995 Tanzanian General Elections. Dar 
es Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1997: Chapter 3. 
--- (B) The Campaign Trail. In Omari, C. K. (Ed.). The Right to Choose a Leader: 
Reflections on the 1995 Tanzanian General Elections. Dar es Salaam 
University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1997: Chapter 4. 
Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty System in Tanzania, the. 
Vol. 1. 1992. 
C M I  
 24 
Randall, Vicky & Svåsand, Lars. Workshop on Democracy in the Third World: 
What Should be Done? ECPR Joint session of Workshops, Mannheim, 
Germany March 26-31, 1999. 
Sundet, Geir (Ed). Democracy in Transition: The 1995 Elections in Tanzania. 
Human Rights Report No. 8, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights. June 
1996. 
Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. The 1995 Elections in Tanzania. Dar es 
Salaam. 1997. 
Summary
ISSN 0805-505X
ISBN 82-90584--63-6
In 1992, legislation formally ended the nearly 30 year dom-
ination of the one-party state in Tanzania, part of a democ-
ratisation wave that appeared to sweep through Africa in the
late 80s and early 90s. In Tanzania by 1993, there were a
total of 51 parties formally registered or in the process of
registering. Today, this fragmentation has been reduced to 13
legally registered political parties.
This article, as an abstract from an MPA thesis, focuses on
the institutionalisation of the five main opposition parties
that have emerged since 1992: the NCCR-Mageuzi,
CHADEMA, CUF, UDP, and TLP. Specifically, through the
use of a four dimensional party institutionalisation model,
this article discusses some of the key factors that limit these
five parties in operating as stable institutions in a political
environment still dominated by the incumbent regime, the
Chama Cha Mapinduzi.
Recent Reports
A complete list of publications and Annual Report available free of charge
For priced publications:
Surface mail (B-economique) free with prepaid orders. For airmail (A-prioritaire) outside the Nordic countries add 20 %
Four easy ways to pay:
Cheque, issued in Norwegian kroner
Post office giro, paid by International Giro: 0808 5352661
SWIFT: DNBANOBB, Den norske Bank no: 5201.05.42308
Order from:
Chr. Michelsen Institute
P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, Norway
Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 Phone: + 47 55 57 40 00
E-mail:cmi@amadeus.cmi.no
R 1999: 5 TVEDTEN, Inge and Selma Nangulah
Social relations of poverty: A case-study from Owambo, Namibia, Bergen,
1999, 59 pp. (Price NOK 50 + postage)
R 1999: 6 OFSTAD, Arve (ed.)
Bergen Seminar on Development 1999. Making South-North organisational
cooperation an effective instrument for institution building. Bergen, 1999, 80
pp. (Price NOK 90 + postage)
R 1999: 7 HODGE, James  and Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås
Liberalization of trade in product services - the impact on developing
countries. Bergen, 1999, 26 pp. (Price NOK 50 + postage)
R 1999: 8 GAIRDNER, David
The role of truth commissions in political transition in Chile and El Salvador.
Bergen, 1999, 72 pp. (Price NOK 90 + postage)
R 2000: 1 SØREIDE, Tina
Korrumperer korrupsjon? En dynamisk analyse av korrupsjonsnivå. Bergen,
2000, 85 pp (Price NOK 90 + postage)
R 2000: 2 TVEDTEN, Inge with Hildegunn Kyvkk Nordås
Angola 1999/2000: Key development issues and national research capacity.
Bergen, 2000, 44 pp. (Price NOK 50 + postage)
R 2000: 3 Whitehead, Richard L.
The institutionalisation of the Tanzanian opposition parties: How stable are
they?. Bergen, 2000, 24 pp. (Price NOK 50 + postage)
